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Abstract: This paper clarifies our understanding of the project based firm (PBF) by sharpening 
the theoretical foundations of project capabilities. It emphasizes the differences between project 
capabilities that eliminate variance in project outcomes (to control costs and add value), and 
economies of scale that reduce costs across multiple projects. It also highlights how the different 
ways in which value is captured by project based organizations can feedback to influence how 
these capabilities and scale economies are generated. This opens up new typologies of project 
based organizations, with implications for theory and practice.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been substantial growth in the literature on projects and project based 
organizations (Hobday, 1998, 2000; Lampel et al 2008; Brady and Davies, 2004; DeFillippe and 
Arthur, 1998; Whitley, 2006; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Sydow et al 2004; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 
2003; Scranton, 1997; Lichtenthaler, 2010). This reflects the growing economic importance of 
project based organizations across a range of sectors, particularly in relation to the generation of 
new technology (for example, biotech firms in pharmaceuticals) or finding new solutions to 
established problems (for example hedge funds in financial services). This increased prominence 
has heightened academic interest in what types of economic activities might best be conducted in 
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projects – the contingency question - (e.g. Hobday, 2000)) and what sorts of organizations best 
undertake them – the capability question (e.g. Lindkvist et al 1998).  
 
The research that has addressed these questions has  
 found that project based organizations are particularly effective at: a) dealing with non-routine 
complex tasks that require the repeated reconfiguration of organizational structures; b) flexibly 
responding to changing client’s needs; and c) integrating diverse bodies of knowledge (Davies and 
Brady, 2000; Hobday, 2000; Söderlund and  Tell, 2010; Davies and Frederiksen, 2009). 
Conversely, they tend to be less well suited for routine, frequently occurring tasks, for facilitating 
company-wide learning or supporting traditional career structures (ibid). 
 
While the literature has recognized that some firms are better than others at projects, we still lack 
a good theory that explains why the capabilities of project based firms differ from those of regular 
firms. “Project capabilities” are typically defined (tautologically) in terms of the ability to conduct 
projects. Since project based organizations are defined in terms of undertaking projects, being told 
that they have the capability to undertaken projects, without explaining what causes that 
performance, generates little new understanding. Consequently, we put the term in quotation 
marks because definitions of this kind invert causes and effects, and thereby conflate a range of 
quite distinct ideas. For example, the ability to control costs, reduce uncertainties, benefit from 
learning and exploit economies of scale in repeated projects would all help firms to conduct 
projects, and therefore would be captured by ‘project capabilities’, but are quite distinct features of 
organizations. 
 
More recent work (Brady and Davies, 2000; Davies and Brady, 2006; Whitley, 2006; Manning and 
Sydow, 2011) has made significant advances in unpacking project capabilities. Brady and Davies, 
(2000) and Davies and Brady, (2006) have related them to strategic learning from ‘vanguard’ 
projects that define new markets and provide the learning opportunities that allow subsequent 
projects to improve in performance (see also Christensen, 2011). Whitley (2006) has further 
contextualized projects by linking the classic concerns of evolutionary economists - the 
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cumulative nature of technological learning and appropriability - to the extent firms develop 
unusual, varied projects that reduce the organizational stability of expertise, tasks, and roles. 
 
Despite these advances there is still a lack of clarity about many key features of the literature 
(Nightingale and Brady submitted to this special issue). For example, the assertion that many “project 
capabilities” can be exercised repeatedly paradoxically co-exists with the view that project based 
organizations are poorly suited for routine tasks and scaling across multiple projects.  In some 
instances projects are used as a coordinating mechanisms within an enduring project based 
organization that can built up considerable advantages over its competitors (Nightingale, 2000), 
while in other instances project based organizations use their partners’ skills (Winter, 2003; 
Ferriani et al, 2010), while in others they are  ‘little more than an administrative convenience’ 
(DeFellippe and Arthur, 1998:137) and exist as a project specific legal entity that is disbanded 
upon completion of the project.  
 
This diversity reflects the complexity of project applications, which has made it difficult to 
distinguish between the types of activities that are best carried out in projects, what capabilities 
organizations need to carry them out, and a distinct set of questions about production economies 
and whether project based organizations are enduring or temporary. Questions about capabilities 
and production economies are distinct, but are often conflated in the literature. By definition an 
economy of scale exists when producing two or more of something can be done at lower cost 
than producing them separately (i.e. c[A+A] < c[A] + c[A]), while firm “capabilities” relate to 
superior relative performance (i.e., c-firm-a[A] < c-firm-b[A]). Firms may have project capabilities 
that allow them to achieve superior performance, but just because firm ơ can produce a higher 
quality project at lower cost than firm Ƣ, it does not follow that firm ơ can produce a second or 
third project at lower unit cost. One of the main contributions of this paper is to unpack this 
distinction and clarify what project capabilities are. 
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Unfortunately, the comparative focus of much empirical research makes unpicking these 
distinctions difficult. 1 Consequently, this paper takes a more theoretical approach and goes back 
to first principles to unpack under-explored issues in the literature. The theory involves exploring 
the speech-act structure of projects, to show how they are structured like ‘desires’ rather than 
‘statements’, i.e. they are future orientated, and completed by changing the world to match an 
idea. This structure is then linked back to the Chandlerian theory of the firm, which has 
traditionally focused on mass production (which has a more ‘statement’ like structure). 
 
The first contribution of the paper therefore is to unpack project capabilities (note we do not use 
quotation marks). The movement in a project from the initial idea to the final outcome, is 
mediated by the application of uncertain ‘operational principles’ that can, under certain 
conditions, lead to design dead ends and redesign feedback loops that effect the performance of 
the project, as measured by cost, time and quality. Project capabilities refer to firm(s)’ specific 
abilities to reduce these performance variances and/or add value for customers.  
 
The second contribution of the paper is to distinguish these project capabilities from scale 
economies. As noted above, economies of scale that reduce the unit costs of additional products 
(i.e., a second project costs less than the first) are distinct from project capabilities  
 
Our third contribution is to pay attention to how value is captured. This is rarely mentioned in 
The existing literature that often implicitly assumes that how project based organizations capture 
value is unrelated to how they create value. However, as the paper will highlight, this may not be a 
useful way to proceed. There are many ways to capture value from projects, that create different 
incentives to develop scale economies and project capabilities. This creates an interesting, and 
under-explored, feedback loop and suggests value capture is an intervening variable that links the 
firm’s environment to the relative importance of scale economies and project capabilities; with 
potentially important implications for strategy and public policy.  
                                                 
1
 Many projects are only undertaken once, often in idiosyncratic environments. This makes 
controlling for contingencies when analyzing capabilities, or controlling for capabilities 
when analyzing contingencies, extremely difficult. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with a discussion of scale showing how 
scale economies are different from project capabilities in project based organizations. We then 
explore the theory of project capabilities. In the third section part, we proceed to a discussion of 
value capture, and link different value capture mechanisms to incentives to create project 
capabilities and scale economies. In the final section we explore implications for future research 
on project based organizations.  
 
2. Scale Economies and Project Capabilities  
 
The literature on projects is very empirical and tends to focus on how project organizations differ 
from traditional M-form counterparts. When it does draw on theory, it tends to be on classic 
organizational theorists (such as Woodward, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973; Minzberg, 
1979; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 1970; Morris and Haugh, 1987; Constant 1982) and the 
product development literature (i.e., Wheelwright and Clark, 1990; Larsen and Gobeli, 1987). This 
literature suggests that project based organizations typically emerge in (1) differentiated and 
dynamic markets with a high degree of user involvement in the innovation process where (2) 
production tends to be focused on one-off or small batches and (3) production and development 
involve complex problems where systemic connections make decomposing problems into smaller 
packages difficult (Söderlund and Tell, 2010:2).  As Söderlund and Tell (2010:2) note the existing 
literature has rarely unpacked what project capabilities are or explored what facilitates their 
creation. 
  
To do this, the paper modifies Chandler’s (1990) analysis of the causes of variation in production 
costs for large M-form firms, by linking it back to the speech act structure of projects. Traditional 
Chandlerian firms generate economies of scale by using high-fixed cost production-systems to 
effectively transform low-cost inputs into high-value outputs, and generate scope economies by 
using under-utilized resources to produce additional products and services. This becomes cost 
effective when sufficiently high levels of capacity utilization are maintained to spread the higher 
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fixed-costs of production across a large volume of output, thereby keeping unit costs low.2 The 
ability to generate scale and scope economies is dependent on a) large markets for homogeneous 
products, b) simple, standardized products with low levels of customization and user involvement 
suitable for c) scaleintensive, mass production or continuous-flow production systems, and d) 
managerial skills to manage the high throughputs required. These scale and scope economies can 
be more difficult to attain elsewhere (Chandler, 1990:12) and When production is undertaken in 
small batches or as bespoke, one-off projects alternative production economies must be found 
(Scranton, 1997).   
 
An important clue about the nature of these production economies can be found in the speech act 
structure of the word ‘project’. It has its origin in the Latin prōjectum (projecting part) which came 
from prōicere to throw forward, which in turn came from pro ‘from (a place)’ and iaciō to hurl. Its 
modern meaning emerged in medieval English as its use extended from the hurling of a physical 
object in space to include the projection of an intangible plan or design in time (see for example, 
Daniel Defoe’s 1697 On Projects). Today, this association with a design or plan is maintained and 
projects are understood to start with an idea, that is often novel, and production economies arise 
during the processes that change the world to match the idea (or some modified version of it).  
 
This “changing the world to match an idea” structure makes projects, like desires, inherently 
future orientated,  as you can only design or desire something for the future.3 This contrasts with 
the continuous temporal structure involved in the mass replication of pre-existing products. In the 
classic Chandlerian firm, actual and potential capacity utilization need to be continuously matched 
because breaks in production reduce capacity utilization and raise unit costs.   
 
                                                 
2
 Hence Chandler’s Weberian emphasis on instrumental techniques of control to ensure a match between the 
potential economies of scale (that are determined by the maximum throughput of the production system) and the 
actual economies of scale that are determined by managerial behavior. 
3
 These differences parallel the difference between desires and statements in Speech Act theory (Searle, 2001). Desires 
(projects) are either fulfilled (completed) or not, and that is done by a process of changing the world to match the desire 
(plan, idea, customer requirement). In both cases the world is changed to match an idea (or design). By contrast, statements 
(production economies) are true or false (there or not), which is achieved by having a continuous match between the mind 
(managerial practice) and the world (production process).  In these cases an idea (statement, managerial practice) is 
changed to match the world, and not the other way around.  
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The structure also has epistemological implications for project uncertainty. Project plans (like 
desires and promises but unlike statements) are fulfilled (or not) rather than true or false (Searle, 
1995). The epistemological issue is whether such plans are realistic, as it makes no sense to ask if a 
plan (desire or promise) is true, because they are not the sorts of things (unlike statements) that 
have truth as their “conditions of satisfaction” (Searle, 1995; 2001). Plans, projects, desires and 
wishes may become true in the future, but a plan that has become true (i.e. that matches how the 
world is) ceases to be a plan.4 Project uncertainty is therefore different from Knightean 
uncertainty, which typically reflects lack of information about quantifiable risks. Instead it 
addresses whether the processes that change the world to match an idea (i.e. a plan) are realistic 
and are likely to generate the desired functional outcome. if projects are to be successful then 
eventually the world and the plans must coincide. This can be achieved by both changing the 
world to match the plan, and also by changing the plan to match the world when it turns out to be 
unrealistic. After all, flexible plans can perform better than accurate plans when targets are 
changing. This different kind of uncertainty is why project efficiency is an ex-post fact for project 
based organizations, rather than the ex-ante concept it is in Chandlerian mass production systems.  
 
The uncertainties involved also focus in different areas. Mass production firms may not know if 
their products will sell, but their production is typically well understood. By contrast with many 
project firms, the project contracts are signed before the project begins even though the final 
execution of the project may not be fully understood at the time.  
 
This has organizational implications. Firstly, Project based organizations typically reversed the 
sequence between design, manufacturing and marketing. As Joan Woodward (1958:23) 
highlighted: ‘with projects… those responsible for marketing had to sell, not a product, but the idea that their 
firm was able to produce what the customer required. The product was developed after the order had been secured, 
the design being, in many cases, modified to suit the requirements of the customer. In mass production firms, the 
sequence is quite different: product development came first, then production and finally marketing’. Secondly, 
                                                 
4
 A promise implies an obligation to generate a future state of the world, but once this state of the world is 
generated and a match between the promise and the world is fulfilled, the nature of the promise changes and the 
obligation is lost.  
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within the Chandlerian firm, product development is typically distinct from production, and often 
takes place in functional (project based) R&D units. This is because the first product differs from 
all the others because it was new when it was first produced (and hence involves changing the 
world to match an idea). By contrast, with projects, production and development typically 
coincide (Hobday, 1998) because production of each project involves an element of newness.   
 
 
 
Variation in Projects 
These theoretical distinctions can also help explain variation in projects, which in turn, forms the 
basis for understanding project capabilities. The processes that move from an idea to artifact, 
involve the application of a hierarchy of increasingly specific operational principles that provide 
guidance about how to generate a desired behavior (Polanyi, 1958: 177; Vincenti, 1990:9; 
Nightingale, 2000).5  Because operational principles have the form ‘phenomena x can be produced by y’ 
they have three important properties. First, they are strongly context dependent and uncertain. As 
a result, they may not generate the desired output, leading to design and production dead ends that 
add costs and time.  Secondly, with large, complex projects the repeated application of operational 
principles generate a hierarchy of increasingly specific sub-problems (how to generate y?) that can 
bifurcate and generate a complex inter-related set of problem solving tasks, with the potential for 
complex feedback loops and redesign cycles to emerge, which again add time and costs. Thirdly, 
variations in projects need not take place exclusively on the cost side, as the imaginative element 
involved in creating the initial design creates the potential for variations in the value clients 
receive. 
 
The number of these redesign cycles will be contingent on a) the number of problem solving sub-
tasks, b) the extent to which the operational principles are uncertain/novel and need to be 
discovered, c) the extent to which sub-tasks and components are inter-dependent, d) the extent to 
                                                 
5
 Vincenti (1990) gives a classic example of an operational principle in Sir George Cayley’s operational principle 
for a fixed wing aircraft which involves making a ‘surface support a given weight by the application of power to 
the resistance of air’. 
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which the underlying technology is “fragile”6 and will need to be redesigned following changes in 
inter-related components and e) the extent to which customers’ requirements are clear and 
unchanging (Nightingale, 2000).  
 
These Additional problem-solving cycles create variations in project performance (as measured by 
time, cost and quality), and qualitative differences between simple and complex projects (Vincenti, 
1990; Parnas, 1985). One can therefore generate a continuum of projects. Simple projects, such as 
building a wall have a limited number of well understood, simple steps, a robust underlying 
technology where problems with one brick rarely generates major changes, and simple value 
generation. The robustness of the underlying technology means they have limited potential for 
redesign cycles to emerge and therefore limited variances in performance or the need for project 
capabilities. By contrast, at the other end of the continuum, building a missile defense system 
involves novel and innovative technology, a huge number of interdependent components, and a 
fragile, poorly scalable component technology – software – that is subject to catastrophic failure 
and often requires substantial changes, if not complete redesign, when its parameters of use 
change. Moreover, the value of the system can be enormously variable, with the danger that it 
becomes out of date during the long periods of time it takes to be built, for example by 
technology changes (Parnas, 1985; Parnas and Clements - 1985), or changes in the environment 
(i.e. the end of the Cold War).  
 
Project Capabilities Firms that can reduce variances in project costs by reducing the number 
and extent of redesign cycles can create value. This can be done through effective project 
management, selection, development and testing (see Nightingale, 2000 for an extensive list). 
Similarly, firms that can come up with realistic designs that solve customers’ problems in new 
ways can also add value.7  
 
                                                 
6
 i.e. where design changes trigger redesign cascades in systemically related components (Nelson, 1982;463). 
7
 The balance between the two will depend whether the project is fully specified (in the 
sense of the customer being able to say how the project should be executed), in which case cost 
control will be highly valued, or customers simply define a problem to be solved, in which 
case creative design as well as execution will be valuable. 
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We therefore (re-)define project capabilities as the capabilities firms have to (a) reduce these 
variances in project performance and (b) design in value for users. These have both a static 
efficiency component, related to how well a firm can carry out a project, and a dynamic 
effectiveness component, related to how well they can design solutions to create value.As noted 
earlier, These project capabilities (of cost control and value creation) are very different from the 
scale economies of the Chandlerian firm and the two need not overlap. Clearly some project 
capabilities will be subject to scale economies; even through things as simple as spreading the high 
fixed costs of capital equipment over multiple projects, but they do not need to be (Loasby, 2010).  
 
scale economies similarly do not need to be connected to project capabilities, and are linked to the 
repeatability of projects or aspects of the project. Davies et al (2006) note that in large complex 
projects, many aspects are repeated: for example, projects with a maintenance and service 
element; projects with distributed delivery of output in many locations, or projects that share 
common components or operational routines. Providing the company can anticipate the 
repetition of the component or sub-assembly or sub-routine, and so plan ex-ante the effective co-
ordination of higher capacity production, it can generate scale economies. Repetition is arguably 
not enough (Chandler, 1990).  
 
 
 
In summary, Project capabilities are defined as organizational factors that reduce the variance in costs 
and/or add value to project outcomes and in doing so increase the performance of the organization. These 
project capabilities are built inside firms, as processes involved in the design and execution of project plans.  
By contrast, scale economies are defined as cost reductions across multiple/repeated 
projects and occur when organizational sub-processes are replicated (either within or 
between projects) to permit the use of common resources and-or learning. These 
definitions, in turn, imply that project capabilities can exist without scale economies and 
vice-versa.  
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Unpacking the distinctions 
We can elaborate on these points by returning to the previous continuum using new examples 
(see also Table One). At the simplest end, a project to build a brick wall using an ad-hoc 
organization of skilled bricklayers would be subject to few if any potential redesign-cycles. There 
would therefore be little necessity or ability to create or deploy project capabilities to reduce 
unnecessary variation in the project. any scale economies that exist are likely to be small and 
related to the repeated laying of bricks in one place at one time. By contrast, a firm building many 
walls may also employ skilled brick layers, but can produce scale economies by bulk-buying bricks 
and mortar, standardizing sub-systems and processes, and investing in specialized, higher-
throughput machines to reduce unit costs. Such changes and capital investments can generate 
scale economies by reducing unit costs across multiple projects, and need to be planned before 
the start of the building process.  
 
Table One Near Here 
 
Formula one car companies, further along the continuum, need to exploit significant project 
capabilities but have only limited opportunities for scale economies. While The teams that form 
these companies build knowledge from repeated racing events, the cars are very bespoke, and the 
economics of the industry is dominated by a focus on the organizational Project capabilities that 
allow teams to repeatedly win races, rather than on simple cost reductions.   
 
Other organizations capture both scale economies and capability development. Accounting firms 
auditing large multinationals, for example, carry out projects that differ slightly each year, but have 
common features across clients and through time. Firms control costs by training staff to 
recognize and solve project problems.  Typically partners bid for projects based on project designs 
that add value for clients. The projects are then co-ordinated by senior staff to maximize the 
billing time of junior staff undertaking more standardized tasks to generate scale economies. A 
similar pattern is found with systems integration firms that create bespoke, one-off projects. Risky 
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high-level design that can add substantial value for customers is normally kept in house, while the 
production of increasingly standardized components is outsourced to tiered webs of partners, 
who maintain high levels of utilization of their production capacity by engaging in multiple 
projects (Prencipe, 2003). 
 
Lastly, with extremely complex, one-off  projects – such as building a missile defense system or 
landing a man on the moon - there are a very large number of potential redesign feedback loops 
and therefore substantial variation in project performance, but more limited opportunities to 
generate scale effects. This rather static framing can be made dynamic by exploring where these 
capabilities and scale economies come from. 
 
 
 
3: Contingencies: Value Capture and Capability Development 
To do this, this section explores how value capture mechanisms influence the development of 
project capabilities and scale economies. Economists modeling the impact of competition on 
profitability tend to assume that firms’ capabilities are largely exogenous. However, the range of 
the products or capabilities that firms offer their clients and the pricing mechanism they use are 
often endogenous (see for example, Chatain, 2011 on project based professional service firms). 
Firms choose a business model, that encompasses how they create and capture value, and 
organize their capabilities to deal with both, (Teece, 2010). This is a different point than March’s 
(1991) suggestion that exploration and exploitation are distinct. Instead, it suggests that within any 
industry different value creation and value capture mechanisms prevail and generate interactive 
feedback loops (Teece, 2001). We would therefore expect differences in the distribution of project 
value and risk between customers and project suppliers to be influenced by value capture 
mechanisms, and to generates feedback loops to influence how (or even if) firms develop project 
capabilities. This is a particularly important issue for project based organizations because the 
future orientated temporal structure of projects means value is often strongly influenced by 
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uncertain and unpredictable future events.8 To capture value, successful project organization must 
anticipate how to execute the project, how it will be valuable to the customer, how to appropriate 
value and how to disappropriate risks. Different ways of capturing this value have different 
balances of risk and uncertainty, require different skills and create different incentives to generate 
capabilities or scale economies.  
 
 
 
Cost-plus contracts shift risk to the customer by requiring the project supplier to deliver the 
project to time and specification, in return for a mark-up on the incurred costs (often previously 
defined). As such, little organizational capability or skill is required on behalf of the supplier to 
assess the economic benefit of the project. In traditional professional services such as law and 
accounting, for example, services are often performed as projects on a cost-plus basis that avoids 
firms having to understand their customers in detail. Similarly, in the 1950s many military 
procurement contracts were let on a cost-plus basis because it was thought that companies were 
less able to bear the risks of mispricing than the government. However, this transfer of risk also 
reduces incentives to build any capability to control costs, improve efficiency or generate scale 
economies.9  Where contracts are predicable, repeatable and subject to possible cost controls, 
cost-plus contracts can leave “money on the table”. Similarly, with very complex one-off projects 
cost plus contracts (with monitoring) are often used, as suppliers price the higher risks involved 
into fixed price contracts, making them counter-productive. 
 
Fixed prices on the other hand shift economic risk onto suppliers. They therefore require skill, 
especially with bespoke projects, as suppliers need to anticipate an unknown future, control costs 
and lay-off possible risks.10 Project capabilities that control variation in costs are vital, and the 
                                                 
8
 By contrast, commonly used, mass production products have known value before purchase. Even when not 
commonly used, or when its use gives rise to subsequent uncertain outcomes, value capture mechanisms maybe 
available in the form of contingent contracts that do not pose unusual risks. 
9
 As projects get larger and more complex, cost-plus contracts can require organizations to trace and document 
costs. In 1966 Robert McNamara suggested better incentives reduced overall defense procurement costs by 10%. 
10
 In some cases, firms use forward markets to contract away some of their risks by subcontracting parts of the 
contract to others, again on a fixed price basis. 
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capabilities that permit successful execution have to be engineered to create information to permit 
forward cost estimation in order to price projects competitively, illustrating how value capture 
mechanisms interact with value creation.  
 
Costs and a success fee pricing recognizes that the future stream of benefits from a project may 
be bound up with successfully anticipating how the project will be used. Sharing future revenues is 
typical for projects that bring together skilled individuals on a temporary basis. With films and 
video-games, for example, the value of the project can only be gauged after it is launched and 
interacts with the final users. Movie production companies sell completed movies to distributors, 
with a revenue structure that is typically based partly on production costs and partly a percentage 
of the future revenues.  Because successful films requires input from the director and actors that 
cannot be pre-specified, classical contract theory predicts such contracts should allow surplus 
benefits to be distributed and critical suppliers to be motivated. Such contracts reward success, 
but The firm has to put together the skills (or capabilities) to make them work. Like the fixed 
price contract, these contracts require pricing, bidding and negotiating skills; reflecting again how 
value capture interacts with value creation. 
 
Success only fees are observed in circumstances where value can be created and captured in very 
unequal ways. For project organizations, such contracts can generate exceptional risks as effort 
will be expended without any compensating revenue if the project fails. the problem is two sided 
and can also occur for buyers: for example, when buying or selling an asset, value is only created 
when the sale is completed. To take account of this asymmetry of value creation, real-estate 
brokers and investment bankers (two project based organizations operating at different ends of 
the value spectrum) charge on a success basis. The broker’s profitability lies in their ability to 
anticipate the market and the customer, and to minimize the costs of failure, for example, by re-
using parts of aborted projects .Clearly in such circumstances value capture requires the 
development of the skills and capabilities required to make a successful sale, that again links value 
creation and capture.   
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As table 2 illustrates, different forms of value capture give different incentives to project based 
organizations to build project capabilities to control costs and add value, and generate scale 
economies. This alternative perspective on capability development has a number of potential 
policy and strategy implications.  
 
For example, discussions of the regulation of professional firms currently pay scant attention to 
how regulations encourage capability development. In the case of venture capital (VC) There is 
arguably a strong case for public support, given their strong positive spill-overs for the rest of the 
economy (the case for there being too few hedge funds is much less clear). However, without 
paying attention to how they are incentivized to build the project capabilities needed to add value 
to their portfolios, public policy is may be less effective than it might be.  
 
For example, policy measures that reduce the costs of raising a venture capital fund, do not always 
encourage them to find creative ways to add value (BVCA-NESTA, 2009). Currently many 
public-private funds are structured using a “2 plus 20” contract where partners can make a nice 
living on the 2% of the fund they receive each year to run it over the life of the fund, while 
returning investors, who have limited oversight, a negative return (ibid). The 20% of the final 
value of the fund in the 2 plus 20 contract incentivizes funds with pre-existing capabilities, where 
returns are often high, But for poor performing funds, 20% of the final very small (or even 
negative) added value of the fund is not a major incentive to improve. 
 
By contrast, the regulations that govern the behavior of hedge funds focus strongly on the value 
creation incentives through a similar “2 plus 20” contract, ‘high water mark’ payments, the use of 
the Sharpe ratio to regulate returns, short redemption periods, requirements that partners have 
‘skin in the game’, and careful evaluation of performance when defining terminal value. Given 
how these features of value capture influence value creation, it is probably no accident that the 
hedge fund industry has generated higher returns for its investors and managers than the VC 
industry (Brown, Goetzman and Ibbotson, 1999).  
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Table 2 about here 
 
4. Discussion 
This paper has addressed some of the problems of generating theory from the idiosyncratic 
evidence produced from empirical research on bespoke, one-off projects. By linking the speech 
act structure of projects to a Chandlerian framework, the paper has generated a more fundamental 
definition of project capabilities that distinguishes them from economies of scale.  
 
Projects are future orientated, temporally discrete, organizational structures that involve processes 
that move from an idea to an outcome, by changing the world to match the idea, or a modified 
version of it. The processes involve apply uncertain operational principles that, under certain 
conditions, have the potential to generate design dead ends and redesign loops that add to the 
costs and time taken to complete a project. These variances in performance are influenced by 
contingent features of the project, project based organization and its market, and therefore do not 
exist for all projects. It is therefore important to distinguish between questions of economic 
governance - why something would be undertaken in a project? and questions about project 
characteristics - why a project would be subject to performance variances? 
 
In relation to the first question, the reason projects are associated with differentiated and dynamic 
markets, high degrees of user involvement and customization, non-routine engineering, 
heterogeneous, infrequent and ambiguous production tasks, and large scale, complex one-off 
products is because these are precisely the characteristics that make mass production difficult or 
impossible. In relation to the second question, project variances are caused by the features of the 
project highlighted earlier (i.e. number of components and subsystems, fragility of the technology 
(bricks v software), stability of user needs, interconnections between systems, existence and 
robustness of the operational principles that are followed).  
 
When variances are significant, firms with project capabilities can exploit them to control costs 
and add value. These are a distinct kind of production economy from the Chandlerian economies 
of scale, scope and speed. Clearly, the repeated use of high-fixed cost project capabilities, for 
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examples, ones associated with learning or the reuse of costly organizational assets, will generate 
economies of scale. However, the existence of temporary project based organizations shows that 
they don’t have to be reused, and interesting questions about economic governance emerge in 
relation to the level at which these economies of scale are exploited (Whitley, 2006). For example, 
do highly skilled individuals exploit them moving from project to project, or can they be 
accumulated at the firm level or even the industry level. This would seem to be an important 
question for future research. 
 
The paper also explored how value is captured and highlighted how different value capture 
mechanisms can influence the incentives to generate scale economies and project capabilities. 
Because of the uncertainties involved in assessing how realistic project plans are, projects can be 
highly risky, and project based organizations are particular influenced by their ability to dis-
appropriate the risks of innovation while appropriating the benefits. As a result, value capture 
mechanisms provide another dimension for classifying project based organizations (Baden-Fuller 
and Morgan 2010).  In this paper we have focused on contracts as a key way in which value 
capture is structured, but clearly it is not the only one. Cross selling, or bundling products and 
services are clearly others, and their characteristics and interactions would again seem an 
interesting avenue for future research, particularly given the increasing service element seen in 
project based organizations. 
 
Hopefully, these clarifications will contribute towards better theories and models of the behavior 
of project based organizations, by providing an alternative perspective on a set of contingencies 
that influence organizational design. As the VC and hedge fund comparison suggests, this 
perspective may have interesting policy and strategy implications. In conclusion, the prior 
literature has too often defined project capabilities in terms of the ability to deliver projects better 
than other firms, or worse, in terms of just being able to deliver projects. By exploring the 
fundamental structure of projects and how they differ from traditional manufacturing, this paper 
has defined project capabilities in terms of the ability to reduce costs or add value in conditions 
where significant potential project variances exist (in cost, time and quality). These differ 
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fundamentally from economies of scale. Unpicking these distinctions, and then linking them to 
value capture, allows a more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of project based organizations, 
which in turn, will hopefully provide a sharper lens to understand where projects are most useful, 
and what organizations are best suited to undertake them successfully.  
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TABLE ONE: Project Capability and Scale Possibilities 
 
Project 
Complexity 
Client  Example Variance Project Capability Scale 
Yes/No 
Low Single house 
hold 
Building a wall 
using skilled 
brick layer 
Limited None No 
Low Building 
company  
Building many 
walls 
Variance in 
costs but 
limited variance 
in added value 
Limited capability 
development 
opportunity 
Many scale 
opportunities in 
buying and 
equipment 
Moderate Formula One 
car racing 
Racing cars High variation 
possible  
Highly developed 
capabilities to 
improve 
performance 
Few scale 
economies 
possible 
Moderate Professional 
Service firm 
(Accountant) 
Undertaking 
large audit  
Lots of 
opportunity to 
get things 
wrong 
Some creativity 
Capabilities built to 
undertake sub-
routines 
Scale possibilities 
due to repeated 
jobs across 
clients and time 
Very High Space program  Land man on 
moon (first 
time once 
only) 
Lots of 
possibilities for 
creativity 
Almost impossible 
to generate 
capabilities 
systematically 
No scale 
possibility, one 
off project 
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Table 2: Value Capture and Context effects on Incentives to generate capabilities and scale economies 
 
Project 
Complexity 
Project Project 
Capability 
Scale 
Yes/No 
Pricing 
Possibility 
Incentive effects 
Low Wall building none None  Contract costs 
determine the kind of 
contract 
Low Multiple walls  Limited: Team 
solutions 
YES – spread 
fixed costs 
Fixed prices Clear incentives 
present to generate 
cost reducing 
capability and scale 
economies 
Moderate Formula One car 
racing 
High, due to 
learning over 
years 
Low Winner takes all Strong incentives to 
generate capabilities to 
win valuable prizes  
High Multi departmental 
services bought 
from large 
accounting firm 
Capabilities built 
to undertake this 
kind of complex 
work without 
making mistakes 
Scale possibilities 
in selling and 
organization due 
to repeated jobs 
for same client 
across 
departments and 
time 
Fixed prices 
common in parts 
of service, but 
cost plus may 
occur 
occasionally.  
Scale of enterprise and 
its complexity is often 
driven by search for 
scale and capability 
High Space program   Need to be built 
over the life of 
the project 
No scale 
possibility with a 
one -off project 
Cost plus Initial low scale 
possibilities; post 
contract performance 
incentives may be 
used to generate large 
value in subsequent 
projects 
 
 
